My work comes along slowly as I painstakingly translate poor cursive writing into something readable for my work. Luckily, it is paying dividends, as there are nuggets hidden within. The Battle of Belmont is all but edited, and I will be rewriting the engagements of Forts Henry and Donelson soon. Most importantly, I plan on celebrating my wedding anniversary with my wonderful wife this weekend. I have been fortunate to spend the last three years with her and many more. Luckily, she puts up with all my research trips.
I finished Auftragstaktik by Charles Oliviero this past week. It details the German Way of War, beginning in the 18th century and continuing to the present. Enlightened Leadership is a German military philosophy that enabled the German high command of the 19th century to win various wars and unify their state. It allowed German officers “freedom to command.” It seems this is common sense, as if officers hold a rank, they are expected to make sound decisions and act independently on enemy movements. However, this is much more rare than it seems. Ulysses Grant struggled with this issue during his Virginia Campaign. It appeared that Union officers could not make the right decision without a direct and specific order from Grant or Meade. The failure to take Petersburg on 15 June was mainly due to this problem, as Hancock was unsure how to act or where to move without different directives. Even William “Baldy” Smith, who was at the front, was uncertain if he should press forward. As a side note, he did not want to order the USCT forward due to his bias against them. This problem arose again at the Battle of Chickamauga when Thomas Wood received an order from his army commander, William Rosecrans, to leave his position and support another division further down the line on the left. Yet, unbeknownst to Rosecrans, it would leave a gap in the Union line, making it vulnerable to attack. Thomas Wood followed the orders of the Rosecrans without considering the consequences. This decision led to the most significant Confederate victory in the Western Theater.
*Orders to Butler on 14 June with the intention of having Hancock reinforce Smith if required.
To Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler
Charles City C. H. Va. June 14th 1864. 8. p. m.
Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler,
Comd.g Dept. of Va. & N. C.
General,
The Cavalry Commander, Gen. Wilson, reports that Ewells and Hills Corps have taken up the line from Malvern Hill to White-oak Swamp. I enclose you the evidence he has of this,1 in addition to our Cavalry having encountered Infantry on this line. This looks favorable for the success of your attack on Petersburg to-night. Gen. Hancock’s Corps, numbering about 28,000 men, will be [46page icon] all over to the South side of the James River, at Windmill Point, before daylight, and will march in the morning directly for Petersburg, with directions however to halt at the point on that road nearest City Point unless he receives further orders. If the forces going into Petersburg find reinforcements necessary by sending back to Gen. Hancock he will push forward. The rations of the 2d Corps, Hancock’s, will be out to-morrow evening. It will be impossible to supply him from here earlyer than that. To have this Corps ready for service you will please direct your Commissary to send down by boat, to Windmill Point, to-night, sixty thousand rations to issue to them. Without this precaution the services of this Corps cannot be had for an imergency tomorrow. Please direct one of the Army Gunboats to move down to Fort Powhattan at once to remain there until the crossing of the Army is completed. If you can communicate with Admiral Lee I would be pleased if you would request him also to send a Gunboat to remain in same way.
Very respectfully
U. S. Grant
Lt. Gen.
Too often did 19th-century military officers want to act like Napoleon, being everywhere at once or giving directives over every movement. Many failed to realize that it forced the lower-ranking echelons to depend on one person for an answer or decision. Another reason why McClellan failed as an army commander because his staff and officer corps was utterly dependent upon his choices and answers before moving, giving little independence. It made this lesson more challenging in 1864, and it would take until 1865 when the Army of the Potomac and Army of the James could act without specific directives. These same officers failed to consider that Napoleon eventually lost as the Prussians thrived. Auftragstaktik gives officers responsibility without commanding officers, encouraging “common sense” on the battlefield. The general-in-chief should not abandon strategy to deal with minor operational issues or tactics. Those levels of war ought to be handled by capable and professionally trained officers ready and willing to take responsibility for their actions.
Auftragstaktik should remain. The German military failed in the 20th century beyond the means of enlightened Leadership. Too many other factors contributed to their downfall, such as expanding beyond their means of production. Germany can survive short-lived wars and wars of speed. However, Frederick the Great was the anomaly in this theory. The Tsar was a Prussophile who sued for peace with Frederick, and the Russians and Austrians were on their doorstep. All other wars were quick and easy to prosecute. World War I and World War II went beyond those theories, leading to their ultimate downfall, but the German military still practices Auftragstaktik.
Question of the Week: Who are some of the most underrated corps commanders of the American Civil War?
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