This past weekend was wonderfully eventful, with multiple upsets in college football, such as Mississippi's victory over Georgia and Pitt's loss to Virginia. More importantly, Liberty is bowl-bound after a victory over Middle Tennessee. More surprisingly, the Chiefs win over the Denver Broncos on Sunday. It seemed that the Broncos were about to put the game away with a field goal with only one second on the clock, but the Chiefs blocked the kick and remained undefeated. The Broncos carried the tempo and momentum throughout most of the game to their credit.
In the American Civil War, it is difficult to grasp just how Ulysses Grant was able to envelop the Army of Northern Virginia in roughly a year. Clausewitz said, "We have hitherto only spoken of the combat itself; it is the real activity in war, but men, time, and space, which appear as the elements of this activity, must, at the same time, be kept in view, and the results of their influence brought into the consideration also." These elements were especially difficult to balance in the 19th century alongside the changing nature of war. Grant balanced these elements of war by beginning his advance into the Wilderness on May 4, 1864, and fully enveloping Lee's army at Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, 1865.
These grand tactical movements were decisive and forced the Union army to march hundreds of miles over a year. Continuous Contact took a toll on the soldiers in both armies, but enough offensive strikes prevented the Confederates from ever retaking that position. Therefore, Grant conquered "space" and time at the expense of men. The loss of life did not come from battles alone but from exhaustion and illness. These casualties were unavoidable as many great armies experienced the same conditions, sometimes worse. It was when Helmuth von Moltke changed how armies moved over vast distances through trains. Moltke only made a strategic decision after considering the timetables of the railroads.
Grant had limited luxury as his army marched over swampy terrain throughout the Spring months of May and June. Yet, every turning movement created a "pulsation of violence" or a decisive action. Clausewitz said that "if the decision consists of several successive acts, each of these with its attendant circumstances can provide a measure for those that follow […] even if others follow the first decision, the more decisive it has been, the greater will its influence be upon them." Many of these successive acts seemed to be merely adaptations to changing decisions and environments.
Before Grant and the Army of the Potomac marched into the Wilderness on May 4, Grant had already predicted that his forces would concentrate either with Benjamin Butler's Army of the James at Richmond or Petersburg. Grant's initial movements demonstrated he could deploy his armies in net favorable positions. It is often the deployment of troops that determines victory and defeat. Battles, marching, exhaustion, and politics play a role in a soldier's thinking, but many soldiers at the start of the campaign had confidence that the rebellion would end under Grant's command. Moltke stated, "One's opening moves yield considerable strategic import. Within this critical window, a well-devised strategy can lay claim to victory. War does not consist of a single blow without duration, but if the initial blows are damaging enough, war's duration can be contracted, and its outcome a foregone conclusion."
As mentioned before, a battle can change strategic dispositions. However, Grant held the initiative throughout the campaign, even with well-devised tactics in each engagement. Like Moltke, Grant relied on tactical encirclement as a frontal movement absorbed enemy firepower. Eventually, the Confederate flanks would crumble upon the sheer weight of the attack. The Army of the Potomac forced Robert E. Lee out of the trenches at Petersburg with these tactics. Grant's selection of officers to lead Union forces by 1864 and 1865 contributed to a decisive Union victory. Grant personally gave commands to George Stannard and Alfred Terry. Stannard led the attack that punctured Confederate defenses at Fort Harrison and held it during a counterattack. Terry captured Fort Fisher and Wilmington, sealing the Confederacy from further supplies. Clausewitz believed "intuitive judgment," such as Grant's selection of men and deployment, overcame friction. Therefore, the General should not only be a Statesman and Officer but also a judge of character. A general's ability to see the strengths of their subordinates and put them in positions of success is a trait rarely recognized by many. Charles Koch gave an interview some years ago in which he said it is part of his job to determine his employees' strengths and place them in positions of efficiency. Grant excels in this regard.
Space and time are subjective in warfare. There is no way to measure what space should be captured at a specific time. Grant's and Moltke's way of war was to design strategies to end wars within roughly a year. These "spaces" require armies to be led by competent officers and grand tactical designs. Envelopment was the key to removing armies from the field in which Grant and Moltke succeeded. It was only Moltke who utilized the train more efficiently. Grant did not have the same opportunity to cross shorter and shorter distances. Yet, Moltke won only six months ahead of Grant's schedule.
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