President Abraham Lincoln promoted Ulysses S. Grant to general-in-chief of all Union armies on 2 March 1864. Not long after, Grant planned his campaign against Robert E. Lee in Virginia. He decided to place himself with the Army of the Potomac, which would be responsible for the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, in a campaign beginning in May 1864. The Army of the Potomac forced Lee to surrender at Appomattox Courthouse on 9 April 1865. Grant's role as general-in-chief was limited to the operational demands of the Virginia campaign. Napoleon Bonaparte once said, "I have tasted command and cannot give it up." Grant struggled to do the same. It seemed there were occasions from which Grant made decisions at the tactical level of war. Tactics involve the planning and executing movements during a particular battle in a campaign. Grant promised Meade he would be hands-off during the spring campaign of 1864. However, by the end of the battle of the Wilderness, Grant seemed to already overstep Meade’s position. A couple examples show his increasingly hands-on leadership.
The first example comes from an incident at the Battle of Cold Harbor. The Army of the Potomac’s cavalry, under the command of Phil Sheridan, found themselves at the Old Cold Harbor crossroads while the rest of the infantry was further north at Totopotomoy Creek. Grant received word that Sheridan was about to abandon the all-important crossroads and immediately had Meade send the order to have him hold the crossroads at all hazards. Sheridan successfully defended the crossroads, which put Grant on a direct path to get between Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia with New Cold Harbor just to the east.
Another episode of Grant’s tactical handling occurred during the breakthrough of Petersburg on 2 April 1865. He issued a variety of orders to corps commanders in coordinating the various column envelopments of the city. Maj. Gen. John Parke, commander of the Ninth Corps, advanced against the northeast side of the city. Parke made good progress against Lt. Gen.l John B. Gordon’s Second Corps. Gordon rallied his men and ordered a counterattack. Parke’s line was thin and could not hold back Gordon’s attack for long. The Union line began to give way, but Grant already prepared for such an event. Learning of Parke’s critical situation, Grant immediately ordered two brigades from his headquarters at City Point forward. All further attacks by Gordon were easily repulsed following this reinforcement.
These examples illustrate the ongoing possibility of Grant’s micromanagement of the Army of the Potomac. Grant never explained his micromanagement, but there was speculation among other writers and historians. It could be that American newspaper editor and author, Robert McCormick answered it in its simplicity, “the futility of the Army of the Potomac in the attempt to storm Petersburg… under Meade’s supervision is sufficient answer to all suggestions that Grant should not personally have conducted the overland campaign. When pressure or other matters compelled him to entrust movements to any of his subordinates…they invariably miscarried.”
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