I was lucky to visit three of the five battlefields before the Siege of Vicksburg and the Vicksburg National Military Park this past weekend. It was an exhausting but well-worth adventure. My colleague and I experienced “Mississippi Heat.” For example, my colleague and I woke up at 5AM daily to avoid the afternoon temperatures. It reached around 90 degrees in the afternoon, but the “feels like” temperature was well above 100 degrees. We would leave the car for a few minutes and come back covered in sweat due to the humidity. Therefore, it is difficult for me to conceive that the soldiers maintained a fighting spirit in this type of weather and sometimes went without water for some time. The fact that Grant’s Army of Tennessee made two attempts to take the city by storm and came close on the second occasion is baffling. However, this week looks at one of Grant’s faults as a commander.
Before arriving in Vicksburg, Grant made numerous attempts to get on dry ground in Mississippi and finally succeeded by May of 1863 after landing his army in Bruinsburg, Mississippi, just below Vicksburg. Grant was with John McClernand when the Thirteenth Corps won the battle of Port Gibson. Unsurprisingly, Grant remained with McClernand, knowing that McClernand had tried to undercut Grant’s command at the beginning of the Vicksburg Campaign. The situation was more complex because John McClernand proved himself a capable battlefield commander after fighting with Grant at the Battle of Belmont. General James McPherson was new to command, and despite graduating at the top of his class at West Point, he had limited opportunities to show combat efficiency. He did prove himself a brilliant engineer, but now, following the battle of Port Gibson, he would have to move northeast towards the small town of Raymond with the Seventeenth Corps, where he would encounter John Gregg’s Division blocking the road on 12 May. Gregg had already trekked far from Port Gibson to Jackson and now to Raymond over the past week. Despite the exhaustion of marching in the hot Spring month, he sought to take the initiative away from the Seventeenth Corps by using his Texans to bring on a general engagement and divert attention away from a flanking action by the rest of his units.
Gregg initially believed he was only facing a small contingent of Union soldiers; therefore, deciding to bring the Union to battle. However, the Union soldiers outnumbered the Confederates nearly 4:1. Amazingly, Gregg’s plan of attack initially managed to stall the Union advance along the Utica Road. Union skirmishers were severely checked by Confederate artillery near the bridge at Fourteen Mile Creek along the Utica Road. General John Logan of the Seventeenth Corps was the first to deploy his lead brigade and artillery. Meanwhile, Confederates from the right climbed down the steep embankment of the Fourteen Mile Creek and back up to try and turn the Union right. The men in blue began falling back against their soaking-wet foe, but Logan rallied his men and solidified his line against the flank attack. Confederate forces began falling back across the creek as Union forces followed. Union forces were briefly engaged in hand-to-hand combat and fell in too close behind the Confederates as the men in gray stood along the embankment firing at the Union soldiers attempting to cross the creek. The tide of battle did not turn until more Union reinforcements arrived, and McPherson stabilized his line by extending them to his left and right. However, it was the 22-gun Union artillery that brought a deadly fire to the Confederates. Gregg ordered a retreat back to Raymond, eventually having to abandon the wounded in their courthouse.
In Tim Smith’s book on the Battle of Champion, he criticizes McPherson for being unable to concentrate his forces against Gregg’s men, leading to an hours-long fight and high casualties. Nevertheless, this stumbling was the result of “green leadership.” McPherson had not independently led a battle and still managed to organize his forces to drive back the Confederate troops. John Logan deserves quite a bit of praise for his efforts in solidifying the line and his aggression. Even Gregg performed well despite being outnumbered 4:1. So why is Grant the biggest loser of the battle? Grant was not even present, but that was the biggest command failure.
Grant accompanied John McClernand’s Thirteenth Corps on the far left, closest to the Big Black River. General William Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps moved into the center, separating the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Corps. Grant knew that McPherson had never held independent command; therefore, Grant should have accompanied the Seventeenth Corps then. Timothy B. Smith says that at the bare minimum, Grant should have accompanied Sherman’s column between the advancing flanks to communicate effectively with both McClernand and McPherson. Grant’s motivation to accompany McClernand was mainly out of animosity. McClernand had previously tried to overtake independent command during the Bayou Campaigns, but Grant did not want McClernand to receive the glory he so desperately wanted. Nevertheless, such command pettiness led to a stalled advance on the right flank and unnecessary casualties.
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