George McClellan was a prime candidate for general-in-chief during the American Civil War, graduating 19 in a class of 56. He attended the school at age 15 and became an expert in military theory, reading about the Wars of Napoleon. He was a veteran of the Mexican-American War and an observer in the Crimean War. He even won some initial victories in the West Virginia Campaign. However, this experience was not enough to cope with the ongoing changes of 19th-century warfare.
In the 19th century, European and United officers often focused on securing strategic positions to gain a tactical advantage in battle. As the century progressed, success was found at the operational level of war. McClellan, believing he could act as general-in-chief and commander of the Army of the Potomac, faced a new set of challenges. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 revealed the problems of this over-centralized command structure, which made McClellan responsible for all three levels of war. This increased his responsibilities but also left openings for exploitation.
McClellan was not to blame for the system. Men like Napoleon possessed unique abilities that the average military officer did not. Moreover, the scale of battlefields changed significantly from the early 19th century. Officers during the Napoleonic Wars could oversee a battle and identify opportunities for their armies. But battlefields grew in size, posing new challenges. Even Napoleon struggled with this change during the Battle of Leipzig. Managing supply lines also became more difficult as campaign distances increased. The lines of campaign in Western Europe were shorter than those in Eastern Europe, as seen in the Crimean War.
McClellan is at fault for not acknowledging his role as the central commander of all three levels of war. Both strategically and operationally, he acted reasonably and did his best to coordinate the various armies across the United States. However, on his own front, he did not participate or was not present at crucial moments on the battlefield. Whether it was Gaines Mill or Antietam, McClellan kept away from the battlefield and did little for the men on the frontlines. This failure permitted Lee to shift his forces accordingly during the Battle of Antietam, letting a unique opportunity slip away from McClellan.
McClellan would not be the only one at fault for these mistakes. Most 19th-century officers failed to understand the ongoing changes from the Napoleonic Wars and even the recently fought Crimean War. The battle of Solferino could have been a wonderful lesson for Civil War generals in that battles were becoming much more significant and sanguine. Sadly, it isn't easy to incorporate this thinking into work produced in the 19th century. It was up to each officer to think initially and use common sense to make the right decisions on and off the battlefield in the 19th century and beyond.
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