There are only three days until the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo. It certainly does not get much attention in American history, but it is arguably a turning point in European history. Napoleon came ever so close to defeating the British and Prussians before the initial meeting at Waterloo. Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, and Gebhard von Blucher were separated at Quatras Bas and Ligny, where Napoleon attempted to take full advantage. He tried to defeat the separated armies, but sadly, it was another missed opportunity as French Marshal Grouchy could not follow up on Napoleon's victory at Ligny. Therefore, Blucher concentrated his forces with Wellington on 18 June, defeating Napoleon's last attempt to reclaim power in France. It is unclear how much longer Napoleon could have lasted after such a victory at Waterloo, but he certainly caused a stir among the monarchs of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. His defeat marked the end of French supremacy. Yet, his legacy lived on among generals across the world until the outbreak of World War I. Even then, some French news reporters compared Ferdinand Foch to Napoleon after the war.
As for the main topic of this week, I want to discuss the Second Battle of Petersburg. After the 3 June assault at Cold Harbor, Grant decided that trying to get between Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia was not worth the sacrifice of lives. Therefore, on 5 June, he opted to outflank Lee's force by taking Petersburg some 24 miles south of Richmond. Grant's disengagement and crossing of the James River was masterful and is noted by some as one of the war's greatest movements. Grant's Eighteenth Corps first arrived outside the gates of Petersburg on 15 June. They won a significant victory at Baylor's Farm and advanced successfully over much of the Dimmock Line, protecting the city of Petersburg. However, William "Baldy" Smith refused to advance when night came. If Smith had advanced to Petersburg, he would have found a rag-tag force of Confederates defending the city and quickly overrun them. Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard was already planning an evacuation of the city in preparation for such a possibility. Smith even refused to utilize his USCT units for the advance. It seemed that Smith missed the only opportunity to take the city.
However, this is not quite the case. The morning and afternoon of 16 June allowed Hancock's Second Corps, Smith's Eighteenth Corps, and Burnside's Ninth Corps to take the city. Grant hoped the Second Corps would reach Petersburg the day before to aid Smith's advance, with John Gibbon leading at the forefront. He wrote to Gibbon on the 15th, "This order is intended for the whole 2nd corps and is directed to you supposing you have the advance. Communicate it to all the Div. Commanders and Gen. Hancock and push forward as rapidly as possible." It is unclear why Grant wrote to Gibbon, but he trusted that Gibbon could complete the task.
Grant also saw an opportunity to attack that morning, telling Burnside, "Mass your Corps on the left of the 2d Corps in such a position as Gen Barnard Chief Eng. may direct and prepare as soon as possible for attack…If they do not, we want to prepare to improve the advantage gained by Smith last night." Grant further reiterated the importance of taking Petersburg on the 16th to both Butler and Meade, writing, "While at Petersburg this morning, I directed troops to be in readiness to make an assault to carry the remainder of the enemy's works South of the Appomattox at 6 p.m. this evening. Gen. Meade is on the field in person and has been directed to make the assault if there is any chance of success." It would be too late to carry Petersburg by 6 p.m., but Grant wrote to Hancock at 10:30 a.m., "Push the reconnaissance in your front carefully to ascertain if an advance can be made, and at what point, at about 6 P. M. today. Make all preparations for such an advance, but do not make it without further orders. However, this is not to be understood as an order preventing you from taking advantage of any weakness shown by the enemy." The last part is significant; Grant tells Hancock that if an advance can be made or he sees an opportunity, he should take it. Yet, to Hancock's defense, the coup d'oeil is a gift that only a few generals possess. It is difficult to know what that "opportunity" looks like from his front. Grant does not give the same advice to Smith that morning; he only tells him that Hancock is senior to him.
Grant's messages to his corps commanders and division commanders present a commander who knows who to address when success is near. Grant's message to Gibbon was wrong and a mistake given the organizational structure of the Army of the Potomac, but Grant knew how to best address the issue. Gibbon had a solid track record and was a capable general, possibly more capable than Hancock. It further presents Grant's frustrations with the command structure of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James. He did not trust Smith to see an opening for an attack on the 16th, but he thought Hancock could possibly see it. Smith's view that the USCT could not carry the works in front of Petersburg was also wrong, and that is where criticism should lay with Smith on the 15th. Finally, the criticism that Grant did not communicate his intended goal with Butler or Meade before that attack on the 15th is valid, but he clearly outlined it before the 16th when there was still a slim margin of success. Therefore, Grant believed the capture of Petersburg was simply "common sense."
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