It was a difficult couple of weeks for Liberty, losing two straight games to subpar teams. I fear what that says about Liberty's reputation as a football school. Yet, I remain hopeful that it was only a blip in their season and will still have a bowl game by the end of the season. If any college football team deserves to make the playoffs, it is Army. Their performance this season is exceptional, considering they are not partaking in "portal play." Furthermore, I am excited to announce that I am about to wrap the Siege of Vicksburg in More Than Grit. I am now in the process of gathering materials for the Chattanooga Campaign. I plan on acquiring more research when I visit Chattanooga this next year.
In John Schofield's Memoirs, he claimed that Union forces never should have retreated from the Battle of Wilson's Creek. General Schofield believed that victory was in their grasp. Before analyzing the tactical minutiae of the battle, it is just as important to explain how these forces arrived just outside of Springfield, Missouri. Missouri was considered a border state in the American Civil War, and it was unclear who the majority of the state would support. Governor Claiborne Jackson resisted Abraham Lincoln's call for arms after the Confederates attacked Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Governor Jackson began working with the Confederate States, but before he could do so, General Nathaniel Lyon scattered his forces at Camp Jackson, securing Missouri for the Union. However, this event encouraged neutral Missourians to pick up arms against the Union. Secessionist politicians and the Governor fled the state after Lyon moved against Jefferson City.
After the Camp Jackson Affair, the Missouri Legislature created the Missouri State Guard with pro-secessionist sympathies. Sterling Price would command this group of ragtag soldiers in southwestern Missouri. He would be reinforced by Brigadier General McCulloch's command. This group of soldiers would now be called the "Western Army." They outnumbered their opponent by 4,000 soldiers only a few miles north in Springfield.
Nathaniel Lyon occupied Springfield, Missouri, with 7,000 men but was eager to move on McCulloch and Price. He had already won a couple of minor skirmishes at Carthage and Bonneville. On August 9, 1861, Lyon moved with his Army against the Confederates camped at Wilson's Creek. Their plan of attack was based upon one of Lyon's brigade commanders, Franz Sigel. Sigel persuaded Lyon to split his Army with the main force attacking from the north while he would personally lead a flank attack against rebels from the south with 1200 men. This idea went against military practices. It was better to concentrate an army, especially against a superior force. Only Robert E. Lee proved it successful during the Battle of Chancellorsville almost two years later. Nevertheless, both Lyon and Sigel thought it best to win a decisive victory on the field.
When the battle began on August 10, Lyon and Sigel took the enemy completely by surprise. Lyon pushed back the Confederate pickets and occupied "Bloody Hill." However, he gave up his momentum to bring up his artillery, alerting the Confederates to what was taking place. Meanwhile, to the south, Sigel also initially took the Confederates by surprise by opening a barrage of artillery. Sigel was no great tactician and put his troops on the road exposed to enemy fire. They also mistook advancing rebels as Union soldiers and were surprised when fired upon. They fell back sooner than Lyon and his men at Bloody Hill.
Despite holding off multiple Confederate counterattacks, Lyon was shot through the chest. The command was handed over to Major Samuel Sturgis, who did not have Nathaniel Lyon's charisma or "grit." Major John Schofield, Lyon's Chief of Staff, believed the battle to be going well. He witnessed the Kansans push back a superior force of rebels from the center of the Union line to the north. Nevertheless, Sturgis ordered the soldiers to withdraw from the field, believing they suffered too many casualties, and with their commanding officer killed in action, he thought further action was useless.
Casualties on both sides were roughly the same, with Union forces suffering 1317 casualties while Confederate forces suffered 1222 casualties. Schofield believed they should have fought after fighting off multiple counterattacks. It is difficult to conclude if this was the right choice. Franz Sigel and his brigade suffered terribly fighting isolated from the rest of Lyon's command. However, Union manpower sustained close to 19% casualties while the Confederates only suffered only 11% casualties. Schofield's analysis is sound in that it is likely that the Confederates suffered terribly, launching failed counterattacks against the Union position on the north end of the field. Therefore, Lyon's command most likely lost fewer casualties than Sigel's. Sturgis should be commended for withdrawing in an orderly fashion because it retained high morale in Union ranks. Strategically, its effects were much more detrimental.
Southwest Missouri was now secure for Confederate occupation. Rebel armies could operate from this state region without harassment for the next couple of years. Missouri would continue to face the ongoing threat of Confederate guerrillas that would be an ongoing challenge for Ulysses Grant, John Schofield, and Thomas Ewing Jr. Therefore, Schofield most likely considered future ramifications for Union forces than the immediate outcomes for Lyon's Army of the West. Missouri would never be a major theater of operations for the Union or Confederate armies, but it took a lot of effort to weigh how many forces were required to repulse Confederate guerilla attacks. These questions continued until 1864, when Sterling Price launched a raid against Kansas, hoping to draw away forces from Virginia and Georgia. Yet, few possessed such foresight to know the challenges of the Missouri backwaters
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