Following the bloody Spring Campaign of 1864, Grant and Lee locked horns around Petersburg beginning on June 15, 1864. However, Confederate forces inside the city managed to repulse all Union attacks. Many Union troops recorded the following events as they settled for a "siege." Yet, Confederate newspapers at the time began publishing accounts referring to the following actions around Petersburg as a campaign. Concurrently, northern newspapers only talked about the ongoing "siege." One even referred to it as another "Vicksburg." No two words could better diminish the generalship of Grant and Lee in 1864. Each term, 'siege' or 'campaign, 'could be used to critique Grant or Lee’s operations. If it was a siege, then Grant's Spring Campaign was justified due to the horrendous casualties. Lee told a Confederate officer that "if it becomes a siege, it will be only a matter of time." Therefore, Petersburg was already a complete victory for the Federal army. As for Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, if the engagements constituted a campaign, then Lee could still take the initiative away from the Union juggernaut. Neither the northern or southern newspapers wanted to relent and satisfy each other that it could be one or the other.
What classifies a “siege” or “campaign?” Traditionally, a siege constitutes the encirclement of a city or fortress. All roads leading into said place should be cut, and parallel approaches from the attacking force should be made to break the fortifications of the defender. The Marquis of Vauban developed these ideas about sieges in the 17th and early 18th centuries. Western military armies practiced these tactics when attacking or defending fortresses. These same tactics were taught at West Point, the foremost military academy in the United States. Grant utilized these practices at Vicksburg when he successfully cut off all routes feasible for General John Pemberton to escape. It is important to note that the Union Army of Tennessee did not completely encircle the city. In fact, only a tiny portion of the southern side of Vicksburg was entrenched. Therefore, Grant and Meade knew it would take hundreds of thousands of men to cover the hundreds of miles of entrenchments around Richmond and Petersburg. Yet, Grant did not entirely cut off direct routes into Petersburg until its fall on April 2, 1865. Grant consistently cut off supply routes into the city, even short-term ones, to provide time for longer-term solutions.
One example is the Wilson-Kautz Raid, in which two railroads were broken west of Petersburg for only a few weeks. Grant had enough time to cut off the Weldon Railroad permanently. Therefore, the people inside suffered continuously, if only for limited periods. At the strategic level, Grant managed to cut off the South Side Railroad to an extent by January of 1865 when Union forces captured Wilmington, which fed into the South Side Railroad. Yet, it was not through siege operations. At the northern end of Petersburg, Union forces mined underneath the Confederate position and attempted to take the city by storm. It failed mainly due to poor planning among Union officers despite the bravery of the Union soldiers and the intelligence of Union engineers. Such tactics were primarily used in traditional sieges. Grant used these same tactics at Vicksburg that aided in forcing the Confederate surrender.
Finally, Confederate forces managed to escape from the city and fled west. In a traditional siege, such options should not be available. During the Siege of Yorktown, British forces surrendered to American troops after their two redoubts were taken, and the British were unable to aid their escape. Much like the British, the Confederates at Vicksburg could not continue to hold their lines after they were cut off from the outside world, and regular approaches pressured their surrender. Grant muddied the waters, describing the events surrounding Petersburg as a siege. When he ordered "regular approaches" and the mining of the Confederate position, he unknowingly affected the legacy of Petersburg. The Confederates could still swing out from their works and attack Union forces as they attempted to circumvent the city in June, and they attempted the same at every extension."
This movement resembles the "race to the sea" during World War I. The difference is that the Confederates constantly responded to each extension and never held the initiative. Therefore, it cannot be classified as a siege. It also cannot be characterized as a campaign because of the unique tactics and operations of the Virginia Campaign. A campaign would indicate high maneuver and the ability to change the place of combat. Therefore, Grant's ability to "fight it out on the line" all summer and into the spring forced Lee to extend his line equally without finding a finite way to hinder the federal extension of the left. They managed to slow its process, but the fighting of such tactics resembled any siege's slow and methodical movements, leading to confusion among the soldiers.
Such a position was always untenable considering if Lee opted to abandon Petersburg, a vital supply line would be lost for the Confederacy, but his army would be largely diminished in the process. Therefore, it makes sense that it would become a siege as the circumstances prevented Lee from an action that was largely arbitrary and wildly unforeseen. Jubal Early's Raid into the north is often viewed as Lee's ability to still outmaneuver Grant, but Jubal Early's initial action in the Shenandoah Valley was to prevent the loss of Lynchburg, Virginia to General Hunter's small Union army. Should Hunter have not retreated into West Virginia or Sheridan won a victory at Trevilian Station, Early never would have made a foray upon Washington D.C. Even then, Grant only sent two corps of his entire force into the Shenandoah to prevent the political loss of D.C. Lee was frustrated by this action telling another that he thought Grant would have sent more troops into the Valley or completely abandoned Petersburg. Lee knew full well the operational initiative would remain with Grant if he even kept a portion of his army outside the gates of Petersburg.
Therefore, Petersburg and Richmond were not an unorthodox campaign whose tactics rarely resembled the first month of fighting. The ongoing series of breastworks and forts was an adaptation to the constant fighting and holding the initiative to remain the attacking force. This type of fighting did not resemble a hammer beating constantly upon the strongest part of a shield but the breaking of its edges to find small openings to inflict greater casualties in the long term on their Confederate opponents.
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