Well, Liberty is in the Bahamas Bowl this year, playing Buffalo. I am unsure how it will go, considering how many Liberty players are entering the portal? They will not be playing in the bowl game. I imagine Buffalo suffers from the same problem. The Chiefs continue their written story. They won again against the Chargers, winning the division title for the ninth year in a row. It is imposing. Liberty basketball is also fairing as they start the season 9-1, even with a win over Kansas State. I will be happy if they can get to 20 wins this year.
The research continues on More Than Grit. Just today, I reviewed William Sherman's memoirs covering his time during the Chattanooga Campaign. At Chattanooga, Sherman and most of the Army of Tennessee were stopped at Tunnel Hill from progressing against Braxton Bragg's right flank on Missionary Ridge. Confederate division commander Patrick Cleburne did an astounding job of creating a defensive position on Tunnel Hill and preventing any further movement against their flank. Historians have recently questioned Sherman's abilities as a tactician, which are primarily defined by this battle. He receives equal criticism from other battles, such as the Battle of Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain. However, these battles are a small fraction of Sherman's career. It is not my intention to argue he was the greatest tactical genius of all time or even the best tactician of the war, but simply put, he was competent, and his competence should not be overlooked.
Most of the criticisms against Sherman's tactics fail to consider the concept of 'friction' in military operations.'Friction' refers to the unpredictable and uncontrollable factors that can affect the execution of a plan. Hindsight, as they say, is 20/20, but it's only useful if the person looking back is in the same environment as Sherman. Sherman's rise to prominence was based on his performance in command of Grant's Fifth Division at Shiloh. He successfully delayed the Confederate advance with limited ammunition and was outnumbered. Sherman paid little attention to an impending attack at Shiloh, but that does not make him a lousy tactician. A lapse in judgment. Sherman's defense began at Shiloh Church, repulsing two different assaults by Confederate forces. He never ordered a retreat and withdrew in an orderly fashion from his position at Shiloh Church. Sherman then occupied the crossroads of the Hamburg-Purdy Road and the Pittsburgh-Corinth Road. Generals Prentiss and Sherman only held this crossroad for about a half hour before drawing back 200 yards north. Eventually, Sherman was pushed back to Jones Field, taking in cut-off brigades. Sherman coordinated movements with John McClernand and Prentiss as they slowed the Confederate tide. The following day, on 6 April 1862, Sherman again coordinated well with McClernand and, on a couple of occasions, drove back some Confederate brigades with his force on the Union right.
Sherman's performance at Chattanooga deserves more appreciation and is often unfairly interpreted. While he was checked by Patrick Cleburne on Tunnel Hill, the operations the day before, on 24 November 1863, went all according to plan. Sherman captured pickets on the south bank of the Tennessee River and moved his corps to Billy Goat Hill. If Sherman had continued advancing after dark, they would have occupied Tunnel Hill without issue, ultimately threatening the Confederate right flank. However, Cleburne's stout defense made it impossible for an attacking army to occupy that position. Sherman only managed to draw away a couple of Confederate brigades from the center of Missionary Ridge the following day, but it was enough for Grant to act and push the Army of the Cumberland forward, breaking the Confederate center.
Finally, Sherman's attack plans at Vicksburg were meticulously reconnoitered and planned. Sherman personally oversaw the landscape, preparing his corps as best he could for the attack on 22 May 1863 and for regular approaches. He personally taught his men how to construct abatis and tried to find avenues of approach that would limit casualties. Despite suffering the heaviest casualties from the Siege of Vicksburg, Sherman's strategic planning was evident. He took Jackson, Mississippi, twice with great movement and ability. The second time he took Jackson, he laid siege to the city without suffering severe casualties.
Therefore, Sherman proved his worth as a tactician. The greater the responsibility of an officer or the higher ranking of the officer, the more likely they are to make a mistake based on the amount of work and tasks. The recent trend of admonishing the tactical abilities of Civil War Generals should be taken with a grain of salt, considering their responsibilities and friction. Sherman made mistakes in the Atlanta Campaign, a significant part of his career, whether it was at Kennesaw Mountain or Resaca, but that does not make him a poor general, let alone a bad tactician. Liddell Hart greatly appreciated his abilities as a strategist and operational commander. However, he would never have been promoted should he have been a poor tactician.
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