Next week, I travel again to Richmond, Virginia, hoping to find documents covering the battles around Richmond and Petersburg in 1864. I am looking for documents on soldiers' morale and Grant's popularity. I am hardly at the writing portion for Grant's campaign in the East, but it would be good information to possess. It also gives me an excuse to visit the battlefields of Deep Bottom and Appomattox Courthouse. I am getting into the early part of the Vicksburg Campaign, which will take much research and patience to comprehend and write about entirely.
However, a few weeks ago was the anniversary of the attack against the "Mule Shoe" at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse. Many more engagements and events took place than this massive assault, but it has led to increased criticism of Grant's generalship, rightfully so. Spotsylvania Courthouse represented some poor organizational skills and poor deployment. His hyper fixation on Laurel Hill most likely led to unnecessary sacrifice. However, his military thinking, common sense, and coup d'oeil remained solidly intact. After leaving the Wilderness, Grant attempted to capture Laurel Hill before Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia could utilize their interior lines. Grant only lost that foot race by a mere few minutes. If not for the delayed advance by Sheridan, the Union would have taken a critical position despite the Confederates having a head start after withdrawing from the burning forest on May 7.
Grant was equally frustrated by the attempts made on May 9 as only more fighting took place toward Laurel Hill. A Confederate sharpshooter killed Union Corps commander John Sedgwick while out inspecting his lines, leaving Horatio Wright in charge of the Sixth Corps. The following day, on May 10, Grant ordered multiple attacks against the Confederate lines. Laurel Hill again proved to be an impassable position. Yet, Grant foresaw openings elsewhere. On May 11, it seemed that Grant was faring poorly against his well-dug-in opponent, but Robert E. Lee gathered with some of his lieutenants later that night, conferring about Grant's latest decisions. All of Lee's subordinates gawked and laughed at Grant's troubles, and Lee was the only one who thought he was faring quite well, considering the circumstances.
Grant was personally in charge of the Ninth Corps because General George Meade did not outrank Ambrose Burnside, who commanded the Ninth Corps. Therefore, Grant had full tactical command of that army group. They only did well enough at the Wilderness to stabilize Hancock's front, arriving late to the battle. On May 10, there was an opportunity for the Ninth Corps. Grant wanted to outflank the Army of Northern Virginia by sending the Ninth Corps up the Fredericksburg Road. This movement turned the Confederate position but needed to be followed up on. Grant should have sent a staff officer to communicate better what was on Burnside's front. There was further success from Emory Upton's assault on the Confederate earthworks. Grant only knew a salient was present in the Confederate line on May 11. Yet, his instinct was that there was a weakness pervading the Confederate line, and he found it on May 12. If a lesser man had commanded the Army of Northern Virginia than Lee, they would have retreated after Grant's decisive blow against the salient on May 12. One historian, Earl Hess, called May 12 "a battlefield disaster almost unprecedented in the history of Robert E. Lee's army."
Lee managed to reestablish a new defensive line, but Grant inflicted severe casualties upon the Army of Northern Virginia. There was no Confederate attack similar to Longstreet's at the Wilderness for the rest of the war until the Battle of Fort Harrison and Fort Stedman. Lee lost his offensive capacity following this debacle. He remained firm on the defense, but Lee knew that was a temporary solution to a long-term problem. Grant again shifted his forces to get at Lee's flank, winning a minor victory at Myer's Hill on May 14. He again tried at Lee's front on May 18 and was quickly repulsed. However, it was enough for Lee to send out some forces from his entrenchments and lose another bloody engagement at Harris's Farm. Grant's record at Spotsylvania remained solid despite setbacks and his hyper fixation on Laurel Hill. Grant could see the opportunities offered by the terrain and position of his men. There was also the possibility he would be reinforced through some other successful operation in his grand strategy. Unfortunately, neither Benjamin Butler nor Franz Sigel succeeded, forcing Grant to push further south again, hoping to get between the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond.
Question of the Week: What battle of the Overland Campaign negatively impacted the Army of Northern Virginia the most?
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