What a beautiful week with the Chief’s victory against the Miami Dolphins. I was surprised we played as well as we did in the Arctic temperatures, but we certainly have more experience with it. With the opening season of College basketball, the Liberty Flames are struggling more than their football team. I can only hope it improves; then again, so long as we win the USA Conference tournament, we will attend March Madness.
This week, I wanted to address an ongoing argument I see regarding Grant’s generalship. However, this is a constant argument related to other historical military figures. Some detractors and critics seem to point to War’s Clock as a measurement of ability and decision-making. These critics often point to the blockade of Richmond and Petersburg between 19 June 1864 and 2 April 1865. These 290 days are viewed as Grant’s worst performance in generalship by some, with the argument that it took him too long to capture Petersburg or Richmond with too much bloodshed. Before diving into this argument, I want to reflect on a few other historical examples.
I always use Napoleon as a reference, as many view him as a “military genius.” He is remembered for some significant victories, such as Austerlitz and Friedland. However, during the French Invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon lost half a million men in 173 days. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia began with great celerity and movement, but Napoleon failed to understand that decisive battles no longer worked. So long as an army remains in the field, the war will continue. Suleiman the Magnificent got his name from victories against Christian Europe, but his siege of Rhodes lasted almost six months, with casualties ranging from 50-60,000 men as the Christian defenders lost roughly 5,000 men. Finally, Georgy Zhukov is seeing a resurgence in popularity as of late. He won some significant victories against Nazi Germany. He encircled Berlin and took the city in 16 days at the cost of over 300,000 casualties. They did manage to inflict close to 900,000 casualties on the Germans, including German civilians.
If Union casualties are considered, beginning with the battle of Jerusalem Plank Road to Sutherland Station, Union casualties amount to a little under 40,000 (37% of their forces), while the Confederates lost roughly 31,750 (45% of their troops) in that same period. Victory and defeat should not be measured by casualties because one death is too many yet hardly unavoidable in war. Therefore, my question is how many days can or should a general be on the offensive with what proportion or amount of casualties makes him “capable?” There is no time limit on victory should a low-risk-high-reward option be possible, which is what Grant opted for during the blockade of Richmond and Petersburg. Lee could not crack Union lines as Grant stretched out his army with minimal losses while Lincoln managed to get reelected. War does not have deadlines or time limits. It is easy to start a war and much more challenging to end it. Generals should care less about that time so long as they win within the political demands of the public.
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