Today marks the anniversary of the Battle of Cold Harbor. On 1 June 1864, Grant successfully penetrated Confederate lines with his Sixth and Eighteenth Corps. It seemed that all was going well for the Army of the Potomac and that they would be between the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond in just a few days. Unfortunately, for Grant, it did not turn out this way. Like any great commander, he adapted to the circumstances and planned one of the most remarkable maneuvers of the war.
This week, I will not address the Battle of Cold Harbor but the Battle of North Anna. It is a neglected battle of the Overland Campaign because it represents a lull as the Army of the Potomac was undoubtedly not defeated and remained on the offensive. Still, many operational movements that were initially a part of Grant’s strategic vision fell apart in the Shenandoah Valley. Therefore, Grant wanted to defeat Lee in the field with the force under his command. Lee misread Grant’s initial intention to get at his army and destroy it. He thought Grant was going after Richmond. Therefore, he was not prepared for what awaited him at the Fox House on 23 May as Federal artillery opened up on his position, killing some of his staff members and forcing Lee to solve another crisis, once again losing both Henegan’s redoubt and losing the battle of Jericho Mills. Grant possessed 67,000 men under his command, while Lee possessed 52,000. Lee faced worse odds at previous battles, but Grant immediately put him on the defensive, again losing the initiative.
Lee came up with a sound defensive plan in which he would rest the apex of his defensive line at Ox Ford where there is a steep incline and would force Grant’s army to cross the river twice in order for one wing to reinforce the other. The Little River anchored the left flank of Lee’s line while Lee secured his right flank with two corps. It worked well for Lee, as Grant believed that his army was on the retreat and ordered Burnside to take Ox Ford. The only real attempt to take Ox Ford was done under the intoxicated James Ledlie that did so without orders and was repulsed with great loss. The Second Corps attempted to break through the Confederate right but failed to penetrate their defenses.
At this moment, another Confederate legend appears from a speech given by an aide from Charles Veneable, a member of Lee’s staff. From this speech alone, it is reported that Lee wanted to “strike them a blow” as the Second Corps was exposed to an attack. The justification for those who believe this single post-war speech is that Lee was suffering from dysentery and was too sick to personally lead it. He also did not have a capable subordinate to lead such an attack, and many of his capable lieutenants were either wounded, sick, or poorly performing. Therefore, the possibility of an attack dissipated. However, no other staffer or subordinate officer has mentioned this account. This account is entirely ignored by both Charles Gordon and Jubal Early, two strong proponents of Lost Cause rhetoric. In his work on the Overland Campaign, Mark Grimsley correctly analyzes that Lee’s position was strictly defensive in nature and did not possess enough “depth” to launch such an attack. Hancock’s men were already entrenched and robust enough to withstand a Confederate attack. Lee did not have enough reserves to launch an attack against their entrenched position. It would also threaten their ability to defend their line should an attack fail. Hancock might be bold enough to counterattack. Furthermore, Hancock held off an attack organized personally by Lee at the Wilderness. It is doubtful that any attempt at the North Anna River would be different except more sanguine. Grant did mention in his memoirs years later that “Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a concise march, or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically two armies besieging.” He realized that Lee could have attacked him, but Grant does not reflect on the extent or if it would have been successful. The second part of that sentence is quite telling in that they were “besieging” Lee’s forces indicating they were dug in. I believe Lee was smart enough to know that such an attack against Grant’s forces would have resulted in another bloody repulse.
Finally, looking at other historical examples, even the Russian General Bennigsen managed to get a good portion of his army across the river at Friedland. Napoleon managed to do the same at the Berezina River crossing. If Lee truly cared only about personally leading such an attack, he represented a selfish “Napoleonic” general looking for glory and/or failing to organize and prepare his subordinates for independent command. It is unclear to the extent of Lee’s illness, but such words might have meant little to a sober and conscious military officer. However, the old Gebhard von Blucher would most likely scoff at the notion of illness on the battlefield as he continued fighting Napoleon while dealing with the persistent problem of kidney stones.
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